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MANDATORY REASSIGNMENT AND THE
ADA: THE "REASSIGNMENT TO A VACANT
POSITION" CLAUSE AND THE SCOPE OF
DUTY IT IMPOSES ON EMPLOYERS
By ERICA GELFANDI
In 2007, Pam Huber worked at a Wal-Mart distribution center
in Clarksville, Arkansas, where she earned thirteen dollars an
hour. 2 While working in her position as an order-filler, Huber
permanently injured her right arm in an on-the-job accident,
making her unable to continue her duties in the position that she
held.3 In an effort to keep a job, Huber reapplied to a vacant
router position within the company.4 The router position's du-
ties were such that Huber's disability would not impede her per-
formance, and since the pay was twelve dollars an hour, the
position was relatively comparable enough to that of an order-
filler, thus providing the most smooth and fair reassignment
prospect.5 In the end, however, Huber's reassignment did not go
as smoothly as she had hoped. Instead of reassigning Huber to
the router position, Wal-Mart made their disabled employee
I Erica Gelfand is a member of the Class of 2011 at DePaul University Col-
lege of Law. She would like to thank the 2010-2011 J4SJ Board for their
backing and for their support over the past year. She would also like to thank
Jill Ausdenmoore for her encouragement and for being there for her
throughout the editing process. She would like to thank Professor Steven Se-
liger and Professor Mark Weber for their input on this article. Finally, she
would like to thank her family for their unwavering confidence in her and for
their constant support.
2 Christopher S. Rugaber, Supreme Court Will Hear Wal-Mart Disability
Suit, USATODAY.COM (Dec. 7, 2007, 2:16 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
money/workplace/2007-12-07-wal-mart-disability-suitN.htm.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
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restart the whole application process anew, pointing to their pol-
icy of hiring the "most qualified" candidate as justification.6 Put
otherwise, Huber was made to compete for a position within the
company with which she had already been employed, when the
only reason she sought the reassignment was her disability.7 Hu-
ber did not receive the reassignment she sought, with the posi-
tion going to a more qualified, non-disabled applicant.8 She did
eventually receive a reassignment and was transferred to a
janitorial position-a janitorial position that paid six dollars and
twenty cents an hour.9
Unfortunately, Huber is not the only person to have faced
such a disability related dilemma in the workplace. 10 And while
the issue of accommodating a disabled employee is one of ut-
most importance-implicating, among other things, a person's
livelihood-courts have thus far failed to reach any sort of
workable solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
In May of 2007, Huber brought suit against Wal-Mart, forcing
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals to consider whether the
reasonable accommodations provision of the American with
Disabilities Act ("ADA") required employers to automatically
reassign a disabled employee to a vacant spot within the com-
pany.11 In Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, the beleaguered and
disabled employee alleged discrimination under the ADA, re-
sulting from Wal-Mart's refusal to automatically reassign her to
a vacant position when her disability rendered her unable to
perform the duties of her currently held position. 12 The Eighth
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 See infra Part III.
11 See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007).
12 Id. at 481.
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Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately found that the ADA's "re-
assignment" clause did not contemplate mandatory transfer as a
reasonable accommodation, as this would reform the ADA into
a mandatory preference statute, which the Court stated it was
never meant to be. 13
Huber's case brought the Court face to face with the issue
that has sparked a decade's long debate among the nation's cir-
cuit courts. While the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this
case, the writ was subsequently dismissed, due to settlement
among the parties. 14 Thus, the circuit split continues to exist with
no real solution in sight.
To provide context, this article will briefly examine the origins
of the ADA and the specific rules it puts forth. It will then ex-
amine the various decisions regarding the issue of mandatory
reassignment and the reasons behind the split in opinion. This
article will then argue that the ADA does, in fact, require
mandatory reassignment to vacant positions, unless an employer
can show that providing automatic transfer would result in an
undue burden or that a requested accommodation is unreasona-
ble. And, finally, this article will apply this reasoning to the facts
in Huber to provide a hypothetical glance into how the Supreme
Court should have analyzed, and ultimately decided, the case
had it not been dismissed.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE ADA
It is difficult to fully understand the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act without considering it in light of its connection to the
major pieces of civil rights legislation, passed as a result of the
Civil Rights Movement. 15 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Vot-
13 Id. at 483.
14 See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 552 U.S. 1136 (2008).
15 See Mandatory Reassignment Under the ADA: The Circuit Split and Need
for a Socio-Political Understanding of Disability, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 443,
450-51 (2009).
Volume +, Number 2 Spring 2011
3
Gelfand: Mandatory Reassignment and the ADA: The "Reassignment to a Vacant
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DePaul Journal for Social Justice 516
ing Rights Act of 1965 and the Civil Rights Act of 1968 resulted
in the expansion of civil rights for African-Americans, as well as
other marginalized groups, and will forever serve as testaments
to the efforts of civil rights activists whose fight for equality
never faltered.16 As broad as these pieces of legislation were,
however, they failed to include protection for the rights of those
afflicted with disabilities.17 Nevertheless, "disability activists of
the 1960s and early 1970s used [these] symbols and rhetoric of
the African-American Civil Rights movement to portray access
for disabled people to societal institutions as a basic civil
right."18
By the early 1970s, the idea that those afflicted with mental or
physical disabilities have an equal right to social and economic
participation and that this right must be fervently protected be-
gan to resonate within Congress. 19 Ultimately, Congress "passed
the Rehabilitation Act of 1974 to promote and expand employ-
ment opportunities. . .for handicapped individuals," though
Congress limited coverage to institutions that received federal
funding.20
The protection of the rights of the disabled was then further
expanded upon by the Americans with Disabilities Act, which
was passed in 1990.21 The ADA was designed to "open up all
aspects of American life" to disabled people. 22 Put otherwise,
"lawmakers designed the ADA to integrate disabled individuals
into society, striving for equality in employment opportunities,
16 See Id.
17 See Id.
18 Id. at 450 (citing RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL
RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY 24 (1984)).
19 Id. at 451.
20 Id.
21 Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1990).
22 Mandatory Reassignment, supra note 14, at 452 (referring to George H.W.
Bush, U.S. President, Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 26 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 1165 (July 26, 1990)).
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government services, public accommodations, transportation,
and telecommunications." 23
The ADA generally proscribes that "no covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disabil-
ity in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advance-
ment, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
ment."24 Relevant to this paper, in particular, are the ADA's
provisions regarding reasonable accommodations in the employ-
ment context. Under the ADA, disability discrimination in-
cludes "not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individ-
ual with a disability." 25 Reasonable accommodations include,
but are not limited to, "job restructuring, part-time or modified
work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition
or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjust-
ment or modifications of examinations, training materials or
policies, and the provision of qualified readers or interpret-
ers." 26 To "make a prima facie case in a reasonable accommoda-
tion claim, the plaintiff must show that she (1) has a disability
within the meaning of the ADA, (2) is a qualified individual,
and (3) suffered an adverse employment action as a result of the
disability." 27 A qualified individual within the meaning of the
ADA "(1) possesses the requisite skill, education, experience,
and training for her position; and (2) is able to perform the es-
sential job functions, with or without a reasonable accommoda-
tion."28 An employer will be excused from providing a
requested accommodation if it can prove that providing such
23 Id.
24 42 U.S.C § 12112(a).
25 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(5)(A).
26 42 U.S.C § 12111(9)(B).
27 Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 482 (8th Cir. 2007).
28 Id.
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would cause an "undue burden on the operation of the
business."29
III. DECISIONS REGARDING THE "REASSIGNMENT" CLAUSE
The Eighth Circuit was not alone in deciding the issue of
mandatory reassignment when it heard Huber v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc.30 The issue of reassignment under the ADA has
come up in many other circuits, resulting in a circuit split.31
Some courts have found that the "reassignment" clause should
constitute mandatory transfer, 32 while other courts found that
the "reassignment" clause only contemplated that a disabled
employee must be given an equal opportunity to compete for an
open spot.33 Further elaborating upon the issue of mandatory
transfer is a case decided by the Supreme Court. In U.S. Air-
ways, Inc. v. Barnett, the Court decided what it meant for an
accommodation to be "reasonable," thus adding a relevant an-
gle from which to analyze the issue of mandatory transfer.34
A. Decisions for mandatory transfer
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided, in Smith v. Mid-
land Brake, Inc., that the ADA's "reassignment" clause contem-
plated mandatory transfer as a reasonable accommodation for
disabled employees. 35 The disabled employee in this case, Rob-
ert Smith, brought suit against his employer, alleging, among
other things, a violation of the ADA for failure to reassign him
29 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(5)(A).
30 See Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227
F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th
Cir. 1999).
31 See Mandatory Reassignment, supra note 15, at 457.
32 See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1301-02; Smith, 180 F.3d at 1164.
33 See Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1027.
34 See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
35 Smith, 180 F.3d at 1165.
Volume +-, Number 2 Spring 2011
6
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol4/iss2/4
519 MANDATORY REASSIGNMENT AND THE ADA
as a reasonable accommodation. 36 Smith had worked for Mid-
land brake for seven years, in a position that caused him to
"[come] into contact with various chemicals, solvents, and irri-
tants," eventually causing him to develop "muscular injuries and
chronic dermatitis on his hands." 37 Smith's physicians "restricted
his work activities by recommending that he avoid exposure to
potential irritants."38 Unlike the case for Huber, however, Smith
was subsequently fired, as a result of his employer's admitted
inability to find an assignment within his department and the
company's belief that it was not required to look outside of
Smith's department for available positions.39 The Court ulti-
mately found that the ADA's "reassignment" clause required
mandatory transfer, basing its holding on an analysis of the stat-
utory language. 40 The Court found that the ADA's explicit use
of the word "reassignment" indicated that an employer was to
take a more affirmative step than simply giving a disabled em-
ployee an opportunity to be considered as one of the many ap-
plicants for a vacant position.41
In Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, a similar case regard-
ing the "reassignment" clause, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals found that the "reassignment" clause contem-
plates more than just allowing a disabled employee to submit his
application along with all of the other candidates for a posi-
tion.42 In Aka, Etim Aka was employed as an Operating Room
Orderly, a job that required him to transport patients and medi-
cal supplies and involved substantial amounts of heavy lifting
and pushing.43 After working in this position for nineteen years,
36 Id. at 1160.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1165.
41 Id. at 1162.
42 Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
43 Id. at 1286.
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he was hospitalized with heart and circulatory problems.44 As a
result of his ailments, Aka was no longer permitted to hold posi-
tions that involved anything more than light or moderate level
of exertion. 45 The disabled employee asked his employer for a
transfer to a position compatible with his medical restrictions.46
Aka's employer refused to provide a transfer, however, and in-
formed him "it was his responsibility to review [the employer's]
job postings and to apply for any vacant jobs that interested
him." 47 Subsequently, Aka began searching for vacant jobs, but
he was passed over for other applicants for all to which he ap-
plied.48 Eventually, Aka volunteered to do administrative work
in various departments, failing, ultimately, to obtain a perma-
nent position.49 In reaching its conclusion that the ADA's "reas-
signment" clause contemplated mandatory transfer to a vacant
position, the Court relied on an analysis of the statutory lan-
guage and found that interpreting the statute to mean that a dis-
abled employee must only be allowed an equal opportunity to
compete for an open position would render the "reassignment"
clause a nullity.50 The Court went on to find that the legislative
history of the "reassignment" clause showed that sufficient safe-
guards existed to prevent an employer from suffering any bur-
dens from the transfer of a disabled employee. 51
B. Decision against "reassignment" clause constituting
mandatory transfer
Siding with the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which held
in Huber that the "reassignment" clause did not contemplate
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1287.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1304.
51 Id. at 1305.
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mandatory transfer, is the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.52
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Humiston-
Keeling, Inc., the EEOC filed a claim on behalf of Nancy Cook
Houser, alleging that her employer failed to reasonably accom-
modate the injury she sustained while performing the duties of
her position.53 Houser "worked as a picker in a warehouse,
where her duty was to carry pharmaceutical products from a
shelf to a conveyor belt."54 Following a workplace accident,
Houser suffered an injury in her right arm, subsequently render-
ing her unable to perform the lifting and carrying duties of her
position. 55 Houser's employer made several attempts to accom-
modate her injury, by way of modifying the characteristics of her
presently held position.56 These efforts proved unsuccessful, and
as a result, Houser sought transfer to a different position within
the company in order to prevent further exacerbation of her in-
jury.57 After the position to which she was initially transferred
disappeared, Houser did not receive another transfer. 51 Instead,
she was allowed to apply for open positions within the com-
pany.59 And with every application attempt, she was passed over
in favor of another, apparently more qualified, applicant. 60 The
disabled employee was subsequently let go from the company. 61
The Court found that the ADA did not require the employer to
automatically transfer her to a different position, as this consti-
tuted "affirmative action with a vengeance" by requiring the
52 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Humiston-Keeling,
Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 2000).
53 Id. at 1026.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 The position to which she was initially transferred was that of a "greeter."
This position eventually became obsolete. Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1026-27.
61 Id. at 1027.
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employer to award bonus points to people with disabilities when
considering applicants for open positions.62
C. The Supreme Court Weighs In
In U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the Supreme Court held that
the ADA's "reassignment" clause must give way to an em-
ployer's policy of hiring according to a seniority system.63 In this
case, Robert Barnett brought suit against his employer, alleging
a violation of the ADA for failure to provide an accommoda-
tion.64 After injuring his back while working as a cargo holder,
Barnett invoked his seniority rights and transferred to a "less
physically demanding mailroom position."65 After having been
transferred, his position became open to "seniority-based em-
ployee bidding... under [defendant's] seniority system." 66 After
a more senior employee made known that he planned to bid for
the mailroom position, Barnett requested the employer to "ac-
commodate his disability by allowing him to remain [in the posi-
tion]."67 The employer refused to grant his request, and the
disabled employee lost his job.68 In analyzing the claim, the Su-
preme Court never directly held whether the reasonable accom-
modation clause required mandatory transfer. 69 Instead, the
Court decided only whether "a proposed accommodation that
would normally be reasonable is rendered unreasonable because
the assignment would violate a seniority system's rules." 70 The
Court held that, generally, an assignment that seeks to trump an
employer's seniority system will be found to be "unreasona-
62 Id. at 1029.
63 U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 406 (2002).
64 Id. at 394.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See Id. at 406.
70 Id. at 392.
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ble."71 In holding that the requested accommodation was to be
trumped by the seniority system, the Court made clear that,
while this was true for the "run of cases," it was incorrect for
employers to believe that "the simple fact that accommodation
would ... permit the worker with a disability to violate a rule
that others must obey ... cannot, in and of itself, automatically
show that the accommodation is not 'reasonable.' ,72 Thus, a dis-
abled employee remains free "to show that special circum-
stances warrant a finding that, despite the presence of a
seniority system, the required 'accommodation' is 'reasonable'
on the particular facts." 73 The Court makes clear that there may
be "special circumstances" showing that an accommodation that
would be "unreasonable for most members of an industry might
nevertheless be required of an individual defendant in light of
that employer's particular circumstances." 74
IV. THE ADA's "REASSIGNMENT" CLAUSE REQUIRES
MANDATORY TRANSFER
Those courts finding that the "reassignment" clause does not
require mandatory transfer have reached an ultimately errone-
ous conclusion, as such a holding bypasses the purposes of the
statute, ignores the statutory language and, ultimately, discounts
the realities upon which the statute was based. In finding that
the ADA does not contemplate mandatory transfer under the
"reassignment" clause, courts are quick to point out that holding
as such transforms the ADA into a "mandatory preference" or
an aggressive affirmative action statute. 75 Such reasoning, how-
71 Id. at 403.
72 Id. at 398.
73 Id. at 405.
74 Id. at 405 (quoting Borkowski v. Valley Cent. School Dist., 63 F. 3d 131,
137 (2d Cir. 1995)).
75 See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2007);
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227
F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000).
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ever, superficially ignores the fact that a disability, by its very
nature, "requires both neutral decision making and affirmative
efforts by the nondisabled community."76 In fact, in Barnett, the
Supreme Court explicitly substantiates this line of thinking, find-
ing that "the Act specifies. .. that preferences will sometimes
prove necessary to achieve the Act's basic equal opportunity
goal."77 Thus, the principal question in deciding a case regarding
mandatory transfer-the ignorance of which has caused the in-
consistent decisions among circuits-must consider, instead, the
scope of duty imposed by the ADA's "reassignment" clause.
This much is clear from an analysis of the language of the stat-
ute, its legislative history and the fact that sufficient safeguards
exist to protect employers faced with accommodating a disabled
employee.
A. The language and the legislative history of the statute
make clear that mandatory transfer was intended by
the "reassignment" clause
A closer look at the statutory language and the statute's legis-
lative history reveals much about how the statute should be ap-
plied. In construing the prohibition against discrimination on the
basis of disability under the ADA, Congress specifically in-
cluded "reassignment to a vacant position" as an option for pro-
viding a reasonable accommodation.78
The Supreme Court has noted that "'[j]udges should hesitate'
to read statutory provisions as 'surplusage"' and thus, an analy-
sis into the plain meaning of the words used to construct the
statute is relevant to a determination of their intended mean-
ing.79 On a simplistic level, "reassign" must mean more than al-
lowing an employee to apply for a job on the same basis as
76 Mandatory Reassignment, supra note 15, at 452-53.
77 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397.
78 42 U.S.C § 12111(9)(B).
79 Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 US 135, 140 (1994)).
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everyone else.80 In particular, use of the core word "assign"
takes whatever action is intended by the statute a step further,
implying that the employer must make some sort of active effort
in accommodating a disabled employee. In fact, the dictionary
defines the word "assign" as meaning "to transfer (property) or
to appoint to a post or duty."81 Thus, the plain meaning of the
statute indicates that the ADA contemplates an employer's obli-
gation to constitute more than just allowing an employee an
equal opportunity to compete for vacant spots as a reasonable
accommodation.
The ADA's legislative history further provides insight into the
fact that the "reassignment" clause contemplates mandatory
transfer as a reasonable accommodation. Particularly relevant is
a House Report discussing reassignment, which says
[r]easonable accommodation may also include re-
assignment to a vacant position. If an employee,
because of disability, can no longer perform the
essential functions of the job that she or he has
held, a transfer to another vacant job for which
the person is qualified may prevent the employee
from being out of work and the employer from
losing a valuable worker. Efforts should be made,
however, to accommodate an employee in the posi-
tion that he or she was hired to fill before reassign-
ment is considered.82
Congress, thus, intended reassignment to be the option consid-
ered "only after other efforts at accommodation have failed."83
By treating the "reassignment" clause as a last resort, Congress
clarifies its belief that reassignment is one of the more drastic
80 Id. at 1304.
81 Assign, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dic
tionary/assign (last visited Apr. 16, 2011).
82 H.R. REP. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 345 (emphasis added).
83 Aka, 156 F.3d at 1301.
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actions an employer might be obligated to take in order to ac-
commodate a disabled employee. If the "reassignment" clause
was meant only to confer a disabled employee the same oppor-
tunity to compete for a vacant spot as a nondisabled employee,
Congress would not have had to specify that reassignment was
to be a last resort, as equal consideration for a vacant spot
would constitute much smaller of a burden for the employer and
could, in some cases, be the most simple accommodation an em-
ployer would make.
B. There are sufficient safeguards in place to protect an
employer who is faced with reassigning a disabled
employee
In holding that the ADA's "reassignment" clause does not
contemplate mandatory transfer, the Seventh and Eighth Cir-
cuits point out that finding otherwise would unreasonably force
an employer to "give bonus points to people with disabilities."84
Finding this to be too impermissibly heavy of a burden, these
courts have held that the "reassignment" clause means nothing
more than that a disabled employee should be afforded the
same opportunity to compete for a vacant spot as any nondis-
abled employee.85 This reasoning is fundamentally flawed, how-
ever, as it impermissibly oversteps the purpose of the statute by
allowing for an employer's interests to overshadow the very pro-
tection the ADA is meant to provide. Such reasoning, further-
more, ignores the safeguards already afforded to employers by
the statutory language and its various interpretations.
The ADA explicitly provides that an employer is obligated to
provide a "reasonable accommodation... unless [the employer]
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an un-
84 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc.,
227 F.3d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 2000).
85 Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 484 (8th Cir. 2007); Humis-
ton-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1037.
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due burden on the operation of its business."86 Thus, the ADA,
on its face, provides several separate forms of protection for an
employer faced with accommodating a disabled employee, mak-
ing the refusal to mandatorily transfer a disabled employer that
much more irrational.
1. Reasonableness
To begin with, an accommodation must only be "reasona-
ble." 87 Useful, again, is a look at a dictionary, which defines rea-
sonable as "not extreme or excessive; moderate and fair."88 In
characterizing the accommodation an employer is obligated to
make as such, the ADA makes clear that an employer is not
expected to suffer too much of a burden and is not required to
step outside "the realm of the reasonable." 89 In framing the rea-
sonable accommodation provision in such a way, Congress
shows that an accommodation must, ultimately, be fair to both
the employee and the employer.
The ADA's examples of actions that qualify as reasonable ac-
commodations further proves that the "reasonable accommoda-
tion" clause ultimately envisions a balance between the
employer's and the disabled employee's interests. This illustra-
tive list includes "job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment
or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies,
and the provision of qualified readers or interpreters." 90 By pro-
viding so many options, and making clear that actions not listed
could also qualify, Congress affords employers a degree of flexi-
bility when it comes to providing a reasonable accommodation,
86 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(5)(A).
87 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(5)(A).
88 Reasonable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/reasonable (last visited Apr. 16, 2011).
89 U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 (2002).
90 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
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permitting employers to determine which accommodation is the
best fit for both its own and the disabled employee's interests.
The Court in EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc. makes this clear
by implicitly referring to this degree of flexibility, recognizing
that a reasonable accommodation is more like an "experi-
ment... undertaken in good faith."91
Further showing that the "reasonableness" requirement does
not impose an undue burden is the recognition that an employer
will not be "required to fundamentally alter its program." 92 The
statute itself indicates that an accommodation should give way
to an employer's policy, saying that
it may be a defense.., that an alleged application
of qualification standards, tests, or selection crite-
ria that screen out or tend to screen or otherwise
deny a job or benefit to an individual with a
disability has been shown to be job-related and
consistent with business necessity, and such per-
formance cannot be accomplished by reasonable
accommodation. 93
As discussed above, this is precisely the issue considered by the
Supreme Court in Barnett, when it decided whether an em-
ployer's seniority system trumps a disabled employee's request
for an accommodation. 94 The Court made clear that the ADA
does not require an employer to disrupt ordinary business poli-
cies in order to provide an accommodation, as this would be un-
reasonable. 95 In general, an employer's policies will prevail, and
other accommodations will need to be implemented.
91 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc.,
227 F.3d 1024, 1026 (7th Cir. 2000).
92 Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995).
93 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a).
94 See Barnett, 535 U.S. 391.
95 See Id.
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2. Undue Hardship
An employer is excused from providing a certain type of ac-
commodation if such an accommodation presents an undue bur-
den. In determining whether an employer will suffer an undue
burden. a court must consider certain factors, such as the nature
and cost of the accommodation, the number of persons em-
ployed by the company, the financial resources of the company,
and the impact of the accommodation upon the operation of the
company. 96 In Barnett, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that
an employer has an opportunity to show "special (typically case-
specific) circumstances that demonstrate undue burden in the
particular circumstances. " 97 Thus, by means of the "undue bur-
den" clause, an employer is provided a built-in safeguard that
protects it from having to provide an accommodation that would
cause it to suffer too heavy of a burden. Further, consideration
of "undue burden" is especially fair because it allows a court to
consider circumstances on a "case-specific" basis. Put otherwise,
the "undue burden" clause allows an employer to present his or
her unique situation, without having to meet a specified burden.
V. How THE SUPREME COURT WOULD HAVE DECIDED THE
ISSUE HAD HUBER BEEN HEARD
Holding that the "reasonable accommodation" clause does
not contemplate mandatory transfer ignores the Act's language
and legislative history, disregards the built in safeguards pro-
vided by the statute's construction, and ultimately discounts the
realities upon which the statute was based. For these reasons,
had the Supreme Court considered Pam Huber's case, it would
likely have held that the Eighth Circuit incorrectly found that
the ADA's "reassignment" clause meant that she, and other dis-
96 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(i)-(iv).
97 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 402.
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abled employees in similar situations, must only be given an
equal opportunity to compete for a vacant position.
The crux of the Court's argument would likely stem from a
comparison of the qualifications standard utilized by the defen-
dant in Huber to the seniority policy used by the employer in
Barnett.98 In Barnett, the Court alluded to the seniority system
being a legitimate policy because it provides for "predictable ad-
vancement" based on objective standards. 99 This policy is unam-
biguous and prevents any sort of "unfairness in personnel
decisions."100 The qualification standard used by Wal-Mart in
Huber, however, is not as transparent. 101
A decision based on merits leaves more room for abuse, as an
employer could "merely go through the process... of considera-
tion of a disabled employee's application for reassignment and
refuse it in every instance," simply by claiming the existence of a
more "qualified candidate." 10 2 While a seniority system delivers
consistent and impersonal decisions, a system based on "qualifi-
cations" alone arguably makes for a less objective decision-mak-
ing process. As such, the Court would most likely hold that the
qualifications standard simply did not merit contravention of the
ADA's ultimate purpose in protecting a disabled employee's op-
portunity for equality-especially when considered in light of
the fact that Huber was, concededly, qualified for the job.103
In the alternative, if the Court did find that the qualification
system constituted as legitimate of a business policy as a senior-
ity system, it would nonetheless most likely find that the Eighth
98 See also Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 699 (5th Cir. 1995)
(holding, in a challenge brought by a disabled employee whose request for
transfer was not honored, that an employer's policy of using "an order of
priority for filling vacancies," which differentiated between full-time and
part-time employees, was valid).
99 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 404.
100 Id.
101 See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 481 (8th Cir. 2007).
102 Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 1999).
103 Huber, 486 F.3d at 481.
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Circuit did not consider the matter as fully as the Barnett Court
had intended for it to be considered. In Barnett, the Court found
that "the simple fact that accommodation would... permit the
worker with a disability to violate a rule that others must
obey.. .cannot, in and of itself, automatically show that the ac-
commodation is not 'reasonable."' 104 Thus, the Court provides
an avenue for disabled employees to receive a transfer, despite
the presence of a business policy that would ordinarily preclude
them from doing so. To be permitted a bypass of the general
exception to mandatory transfer provided by a business policy, a
plaintiff "must present evidence of.. .special circumstances sur-
rounding the particular case that demonstrate the assignment is
nonetheless reasonable. '" 105 The Eighth Circuit did not make any
indication that it considered whether Huber's particular circum-
stances warranted such an exception. 10 6 As such, if the Supreme
Court were to find the qualification standard comparable to a
seniority system, it would likely rule similarly to how it did in
Barnett, requiring for the Circuit judgment to be vacated and
ordering a remand for a more complete consideration of the
plaintiff's particular circumstances. 10 7
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, at the core of the ADA is the desire to "open up
all aspects of American life" to disabled people. 108 The passing
of the statute was in recognition that the focus need no longer
be on the paternalistic idea that disabled people should be reha-
bilitated into society.10 9 Instead, the ADA was "designed... to
104 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 398.
105 Id. at 406.
106 See Huber, 486 F.3d 480.
107 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 406.
108 Mandatory Reassignment, supra note 15, at 452 (quoting George H.W.
Bush, U.S. President, State on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 26 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 1165 (July 26, 1990)).
109 Id.
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integrate disabled individuals into society, striving for equality
[in all areas of life].11°
The ADA is "distinct from antidiscrimination laws, because
the ADA not only bars discrimination but also requires affirma-
tive steps in certain contexts."111 Unlike the case for discrimina-
tion based on personal characteristics, such as skin color, sex,
and age, discrimination based on a person's disability centers
around a characteristic that legitimately places a physical barrier
in someone's life.12 Because of this ultimate distinction, Con-
gress intended the ADA to obligate employers to take extra
steps to ensure that disabled employees will enjoy the same op-
portunities and comforts at work as their nondisabled co-
workers.11 3
As part of the obligation to ensure equality in the workplace,
the ADA provides that an employer must afford a disabled em-
ployee a reasonable accommodation when a disability prevents
the employee from fully performing the duties to which he or
she is assigned.114 In contemplating what entails a reasonable ac-
commodation, Congress made sure to provide an employer with
a degree of flexibility by providing an illustrative, non-exhaus-
tive list of actions it could take.115 The plethora of options avail-
able to the employer, as well as the safeguards provided by the
statute, function to lessen the burden felt by an employer faced
with the need to provide an accommodation for a disabled
employee.
One of the options for a reasonable accommodation is "reas-
signment to a vacant position."11 6 The most logical interpreta-
tion, as well as the interpretation most consistent with the
'to Id.
it' Id.
112 See Id.
113 See supra Part IV.A.
114 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
115 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
116 Id.
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statutory language and the statute's legislative history, is that
the "reassignment" clause contemplates mandatory transfer as a
reasonable accommodation. Holding the "reassignment" clause
to confer mandatory transfer does not impermissibly turn the
ADA into an aggressive affirmative action statute. On the con-
trary, this conclusion, when considered in conjunction with the
statutory language and the safeguards it provides to an em-
ployer, is exactly what Congress contemplated when enacting
the ADA. It is the conclusion that is most consistent with the
ultimate purpose of the ADA, in that it most effectively guaran-
tees a disabled employee an opportunity to exist on equal foot-
ing with his or her nondisabled co-workers and, ultimately,
opens the door to at least one aspect of American life.
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